Fluid reasoning is equivalent to relation processing by Jastrzębski, Jan et al.
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Intelligence
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/intell
Fluid reasoning is equivalent to relation processing
Jan Jastrzębskia,⁎, Michał Ociepkab, Adam Chuderskia
a Institute of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, Grodzka 52, 31-044 Krakow, Poland
b Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Ingardena 6, 30-060 Krakow, Poland





A B S T R A C T
Fluid reasoning (Gf)—the ability to reason abstractly—is typically measured using nonverbal inductive rea-
soning tests involving the discovery and application of complex rules. We tested whether Gf, as measured by
such traditional assessments, can be equivalent to relation processing (a much simpler process of validating
whether perceptually available stimuli satisfy the arguments of a single predefined relation—or not).
Confirmatory factor analysis showed that the factor capturing variance shared by three relation processing tasks
was statistically equivalent to the Gf factor loaded by three hallmark fluid reasoning tests. Moreover, the two
factors shared most of their residual variance that could not be explained by working memory. The results imply
that many complex operations typically associated with the Gf construct, such as rule discovery, rule integration,
and drawing conclusions, may not be essential for Gf. Instead, fluid reasoning ability may be fully reflected in a
much simpler ability to effectively validate single, predefined relations.
1. Introduction
The construct of fluid intelligence (Cattell, 1963), or fluid reasoning
(Gf; Carroll, 1993), represents a broad cognitive ability related to the
employment of such mental operations as “drawing inferences, concept
formation, classification, generating and testing hypothesis, identifying
relations, comprehending implications, problem solving, extrapolating,
and transforming information” (McGrew, 2009, p. 5). The Gf factor is
one of the most prominent psychological constructs, one that sub-
stantially predicts outcomes in multiple social domains—from aca-
demic and work success to health and longevity. As well, it strongly
correlates with cognitive performance on various tasks, from mental
speed and perception to long-term memory and verbal comprehension
(Deary, 2012).
As “inductive and deductive reasoning are generally considered the
hallmark indicators of Gf” (McGrew, 2009, p. 5), Gf is typically mea-
sured using nonverbal tests that require inductive reasoning and spatial
visualization. Virtually all such tests involve the discovery of abstract
rules and patterns that govern relatively complex figural stimuli and,
further, the application of these rules/patterns to select the best
matching response option. Probably the most influential Gf test is Ra-
ven's Advanced Progressive Matrices (RAPM; Raven, 1938; Raven,
Raven, & Court, 1998). RAPM presents the variants of a 3×3 matrix of
geometric patterns, of which a bottom right pattern is missing. The test
requires inducing this pattern from the structure of the row- and
column-wise changes (e.g., permutation, increase in number or value,
application of logical operations such as AND, OR, and XOR, etc.)
across the remaining eight patterns. Matrix problems are also included
on another popular Gf test: Cattell's Culture Free Intelligence Test (CFT-
3; Cattell, 1961). Its three other sections require pattern series com-
pletion, shape categorization, and understanding topological relations.
In another kind of Gf test, figural analogies (Snow, Kyllonen, &
Marshalek, 1984), the structure of geometric transformations must be
identified between two patterns (A & B); then the same transformations
must be applied to pattern C to infer the correct analog of B (A:B::C:?→
D).
Charles Spearman, the founder of intelligence research, believed
that RAPM and similar tests strongly involve two mental operations
that are crucial to cognitive ability: so-called eduction of relations
(abstracting a relation from the configuration of concrete elements) and
eduction of correlates (predicting the configuration of the elements
given the relation). In modern psychological terms, the operations
stressed by Spearman can be described as identifying the valid relations
when the values of its arguments are known (i.e., rule/relation dis-
covery) and assigning the valid values to the arguments for the known
relation (i.e., relation instantiation), respectively.
Recent research (Halford, Wilson, & Phillips, 1998; Oberauer, Süβ,
Wilhelm, & Wittmann, 2008) has supported the central role of relations
in explaining individual differences in Gf. Moreover, multiple studies
(see Gentner & Kurtz, 2005; Holyoak, 2012; Johnson-Laird, 2012) have
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suggested that traditionally distinguished kinds of reasoning, including
deduction, induction, abduction, categorization, and analogies—all
mentioned in the above definition of Gf—can be unified theoretically
under the concept of relational reasoning (i.e., mental processing of re-
lations in a way that preserves the valid assignment of values to the
consecutive arguments of the relation, regardless of what exactly are
the relation, values, and arguments). This property is called structural
consistency; for instance, when taller[Tom, John] is transformed in the
mind into shorter[X, Y], the value-argument assignments must remain
(shorter[John, Tom]), and neither John's nor Tom's properties can
change (see Doumas & Hummel, 2010). This may be a trivial task for a
binary relation such as taller but becomes a highly demanding operation
when the number of arguments increases (e.g., Birney & Bowman,
2009; Chuderski, 2014; Halford, Baker, McCredden, & Bain, 2005;
Halford, Cowan, & Andrews, 2007).
However, typical fluid/relational reasoning tests require integrating
multiple relations into multiple compound rules that must be inferred
from relatively complex stimuli. They also involve elaborate manage-
ment of subgoals (e.g., switching between inspecting the problem and
analyzing the response options; Hayes, Petrov, & Sederberg, 2011;
Jarosz & Wiley, 2012). All this entails a relatively long reasoning pro-
cess that may be influenced by the use of various strategies (Jarosz,
Raden, & Wiley, 2019) as well as by other factors. Thus, the exact role
of processing relations for reasoning cannot readily be studied. To avoid
such problems and more precisely examine processing relations, much
simpler relational tasks have been developed, including the Latin
Square Task (Birney & Bowman, 2009) and variants of the transitive
reasoning task (Goodwin & Johnson-Laird, 2008).
Probably the most successful task in this vein is the relation mon-
itoring task (Oberauer, Su, Wilhelm, & Wittman, 2003). In one variant
of the measure, people observe a constantly changing matrix of symbols
and decide whether all of the strings in one row, column, or diagonal
line end with the same symbol. The task thus requires identifying re-
lations among the symbols while imposing relatively low storage re-
quirements (as all the information is available on-screen). Despite the
task's simplicity, several of its variants have been shown to be sur-
prisingly good predictors of Gf, above and beyond other tasks
(Bateman, Thompson, & Birney, 2019; Chuderski, 2014; Oberauer
et al., 2008).
The strong correlation of working memory (WM) capacity (WMC)
with Gf (50–75% variance shared; see Kane, Hambrick, & Conway,
2005; Oberauer, Wilhelm, Schulze, & Süß, 2005) strongly implies that
individual effectiveness of relation processing—a mental operation
defined at a relatively abstract level—is determined by a limitation at
the fine-grained level of WM. Although WM has received many defi-
nitions and models, generally it can be summarized as the cognitive
mechanism responsible for active maintenance of and access to a lim-
ited amount of information crucial for the current task/action/thought
(Cowan, 2017). WMC is typically measured using relatively simpler
tasks (as compared to reasoning tests) that might require storage and
recall of several items (simple span tasks), storage and recall under
concurrent processing on the distracting task (complex-span tasks) or
quick updating of the information maintained (memory updating
tasks).
One potential way in which WM could constrain relation processing
is the maximum number of slots, or amount of resources, available
(Colom, Abad, Quiroga, Shih, & Flores-Mendoza, 2008). For instance, a
person able to maintain only three elements in WM (a typical average
capacity in the general population) could fail to process a quaternary
relation, given an incapacity to grasp all its arguments at once. How-
ever, this possibility is not altogether plausible, as multiple studies on
relation processing (e.g., Goldstone & Medin, 1994; Keane, 1997;
Kubose, Holyoak, & Hummel, 2002) have suggested that even complex
relations can be effectively processed in an incremental way (but see
Halford et al., 2005). Another option of how WM could determine how
well relations are processed is how strong is the control that can be
exerted over WM contents. Strong control might block distractors (e.g.,
salient but invalid argument values) and remove elements that are no
longer relevant, thereby facilitating relation processing (Jarosz &
Wiley, 2012; Kane & Engle, 2002; Kovacs & Conway, 2016;). However,
many studies failed to observe sufficiently strong correlations between
hallmark executive control tasks and Gf (Chuderski, Taraday, Nęcka, &
Smoleń, 2012; Colom et al., 2008; Friedman et al., 2006; Rey-Mermet,
Gade, Souza, von Bastian, & Oberauer, 2019; Unsworth, Fukuda, Awh,
& Vogel, 2014), with an exception for the antisaccades task (Rey-
Mermet et al., 2019).
Alternatively, the authors of the relation monitoring task (Oberauer
et al., 2007) have posed the binding hypothesis, assuming that the crucial
building blocks underpinning relations in the mind consist of temporary
bindings that are constructed, maintained, and finally dissolved in WM.
Such bindings constitute “atomic” relations that can link one item to
another (e.g., to make a pair) or an item with its context (e.g., to encode
the item's position or membership). The binding construct seems ideally
suited to explain the assignment of values to relational arguments (cf.,
Chuderski & Andrelczyk, 2015; Halford et al., 2007; Hummel &
Holyoak, 1997). To process a relation (but also remember an ordered
list or understand a longer utterance), one must be able to maintain in
WM a sufficient number of bindings in parallel (Oberauer, 2019). In
addition to upholding single bindings in WM, the ability to integrate
such bindings into novel structural representations (so-called relational
integration) can also be crucial. According to the binding hypothesis,
effective relational integration enables the recall of a memory list in the
proper order within the complex span, permits transforming several
item-item bindings into noticing the row or column of identical symbols
in the relation monitoring task, as well as poses a limit on relations that
can be effectively processed in Gf tests. As a result, the capacity for
bindings and relational integration is the driving force for the strong
intercorrelations among all these kinds of tasks (Oberauer et al., 2008).
Exploring the role of temporary bindings further, a recent study
(Chuderski, 2019) indicated that processing of even a single binding
between two symbols, without needing to integrate them into a struc-
ture, can be crucial for Gf. In an apparently trivial task, only binary and
meaningless relations between symbols needed to be compared (letters
connected by “/” or “\” sign) to identify identical relations (i.e., that
“A/B" is identical to “A/B" but not to “A\B"). Despite the fact that errors
on the task were rare, their rate still predicted scores on RAPM and a
figural analogies test surprisingly well (comparably to the two latter
scores correlation). However, when the symbols were not bound by any
sign and thus could be easily chunked into one representation (“AB”),
the task no longer correlated with Gf. Thus, Gf may not only depend on
the available quantity of bindings in WM but rather on their reliability
and stability (a binding must prevail undistorted until the processing of
relation is complete).
Summing up, there is a growing body of research suggesting that Gf
primarily reflects how well one represents relations in the mind (even
simple ones). However, the extent to which the construct of Gf can be
translated into the ability to process relations has not been precisely
defined. Consequently, the present study aimed to examine how far Gf,
paradigmatically operationalized as the variance in scores on tradi-
tional fluid/relational reasoning tests—which require identifying un-
known relations (in RAPM, discovering new rules); integrating them
(combining up to five rules per a problem); inferring the missing values
of their arguments (constructing the missing ninth cell), and —also
most likely—involving learning (Bui & Birney, 2014; Kaufman,
DeYoung, Gray, Brown, & Mackintosh, 2009); goal management
(Carpenter, Just, & Shell, 1990); and various strategies (Jarosz et al.,
2019)—can be explained in simpler and more univocal terms of pro-
cessing a relation.
1.1. Relation processing tasks
To achieve this aim, we applied three relation processing tasks. Two
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tasks, Monitoring and Comparing, were modified variants of the pre-
viously-mentioned tasks developed by Oberauer et al. (2003) and
Chuderski (2019), respectively. Also, we introduced a newly-developed
task:Matching (see below). In all three tasks, the typical requirements of
the Gf tests, mentioned above, are greatly reduced or absent. Each task
requires validating whether the elements present on the screen do or do
not satisfy a predefined relation. To achieve this, some relational in-
formation must be processed.
In Monitoring, participants need to validate the “all different” rela-
tion among several Greek letters in a row or column of a matrix (no two
letters can be identical). Most likely, this requires rapid construction of
temporary bindings among all the letter pairs in the given row/column
and their integration into one relational representation. For example,
four letters in a row/column (e.g., δ λ π θ) require building the max-
imum of six bindings (δ-λ, δ-π, δ-θ, λ-π, λ-θ, π-θ). The relation mon-
itoring process for the given row/column stops when the identity be-
tween two letters is found (which falsifies the relation) or when no
identity can be detected (and thus the relation becomes validated). We
expect that the validation process of the “all different” relation is most
effective when all the possible bindings among pairs of letters can be
upheld and compared in WM in a single step. When not all such
bindings can be held in a temporary store (due to limited capacity for
bindings or attentional lapses), the process needs to be segmented and
the letters bound and integrated into subgroups. In this case, the
probability of missing an identity between a pair of letters increases and
accuracy drops (for a process model of a variant of this task, see
Chuderski, Andrelczyk, & Smolen, 2013).
In Comparing, participants need to decide whether two pairs of
shapes (related to each other by either the “larger than” or” smaller
than” relation) represent identical relations despite variant layouts of
the shapes and the relation symbol (e.g., that ○ > □ means the same
as □ < ○ but not the same as ○ < □ and ○ > ∆). We assume that to
solve this task, a pair must first be represented as a proper binding of
the objects to their specific roles in that relation (○-larger, □-smaller).
Next, such a representation must be maintained in WM in order to be
compared to other pairs (that also must be encoded in the same way).
Some pairs may readily be excluded, e.g. when they include one or two
shapes different from those in the maintained pair. Crucially, however,
to correctly validate whether the two compared pairs that included the
same shapes satisfy the same unique relation, the participant must
maintain proper bindings between the specific shapes and their specific
roles in that relation. In consequence, most errors in the task should
result from misrepresenting such bindings or a failure in retaining them
in WM. Therefore, the ability to properly encode and maintain stable
relational representations during a concurrent processing should lead to
more effective solving of the Comparing task.
Finally, in Matching, two perceptually-different but relationally-
isomorphic directed graphs are presented. Participants must match two
vertices across the two graphs. Each vertex can be identified by the
number of incoming and outgoing edges (its degree). Encoding the
degree requires representing a relation of the specific vertex with the
number of its incoming and outgoing edges. Such a relation may be
binary (e.g. “the vertex has one incoming edge”) or may have more
arguments (e.g. “one incoming and two outgoing edges”). Next, such a
representation needs to be maintained in WM and compared to the
degrees of other vertices, in order to validate whether the compared
representations satisfy the same unique relation (e.g., “having one in-
coming and two outgoing edges”). Moreover, identification of the
vertices and navigation through the problem elements is also achieved
by utilizing the unique connections among the circles, which requires
assigning the proper vertices into proper roles in the relation (e.g., “the
vertex with one outgoing edge connects to the other specific vertex”).
This applies especially to the most difficult graphs, in which partici-
pants need to discriminate between two vertices of the same degree by
representing the pattern of their connections to other vertices. In con-
sequence, errors in the task should result from misrepresenting the
degrees of the vertices and the relations between two or more vertices.
1.2. Research questions
Our two main predictions were as follows: First, we expected that
the variance in scores on relation processing tasks, which were designed
to primarily require validation of whether the given arguments satisfy
the predefined relation or not, would be statistically equivalent to Gf. If
such variance could be equivalent to Gf, then most aspects of typical
operationalization of Gf would not be necessary for measuring this
construct (because the simple validation of whether the predefined
relation holds or not for the given data unlikely involves relation dis-
covery, inference, and learning; it probably also, to a degree, captures
goal management and strategies). Therefore, such a result would purify
the Gf construct. Moreover, a potential demonstration that the Gf var-
iance equates variance in validation of the arguments of a relation can
direct future research on the WM-based mechanisms of Gf (e.g., high-
lighting a potential role of temporary bindings). However, it must be
noted that the present, purely correlational, study cannot allow for
drawing conclusions about the exact (neuro)cognitive mechanisms
underlying Gf and relation processing.
Second, on the basis of existing literature (Gignac, 2014; Kyllonen &
Christal, 1990; Oberauer et al., 2005), we expected that WMC, as as-
sessed with the typical simple span, complex span, and updating tasks,
could not be statistically equivalent to Gf. We further predicted that our
relation processing tasks would be able to explain the Gf variance
(above and beyond WMC). On the one hand, the binding hypothesis
predicts that the WM tasks, the relation processing tasks, and the Gf
tests all rely on upholding items and bindings in WM—what likely
drives their shared variance (see Oberauer et al., 2008). However,
whereas the WM tasks primarily demand the holding of sheer items up
to full memory capacity, the relation processing tasks and Gf tests ty-
pically do not (all the items are present on the screen or the paper sheet
and can be attended to when needed). Moreover, both the Gf tests and
the relation processing tasks require not only upholding the component
bindings (the value-argument assignments) but also integrating them
into a single complete relation (in the relation processing tasks) and
even in a more complex structural representation (e.g., in RAPM and
CFT-3), making their variances converge, whereas the WM tasks typi-
cally do not involve explicit relations (e.g., an unordered set of item-
position bindings suffices to recall in the complex span task), causing
WMC variance to diverge. In consequence, the capacity to uphold all
the necessary information in WM (items, context, bindings), as reflected
by high WMC, would not automatically lead to high Gf (even though
the two would be strongly correlated), because even if all this in-
formation is present in WM, still the relation can be processed in-
correctly (e.g., structure consistency can be violated), leading to rela-
tional errors.
To sum up, three relation processing tasks, three established rea-
soning tests, and three WMC tasks were administered. Each task cate-
gory corresponded to their respective latent variable (factor): Relation
Processing, Fluid Reasoning, and WMC. All three factors and their re-
lationships were modeled using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). The
decisive model tested whether Relation Processing could be equivalent to
Fluid Reasoning (i.e., if the correlation between these factors is statisti-
cally indistinguishable) while Fluid Reasoning, on the other hand, is
distinguishable from WMC. Also, structural equation modeling (SEM)
determined whether Relation Processing could account for Gf var-
iance—above and beyond WMC (as well as fully mediate the link of
WMC to Fluid Reasoning).
2. Method
2.1. Participants
Two hundred forty-five participants (154 women, 77 men) were
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recruited using ads on popular websites; participants were paid the
equivalent of 10 euros for their participation. Their mean age was
22.8 years (SD=3.1, range=18–35). Most of the participants were
students (56%). All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The
participants were informed that participation was anonymous and that
they could end their participation at will at any moment. The study
fully conformed with the Declaration of Helsinki.
2.2. Relation processing tasks
For illustration of the tasks see Fig. 1. Each trial of Monitoring in-
cluded an n× n array of pairs of Greek letters, presented at the center
of the screen. The task required scanning the right-hand letters of the
consecutive pairs, while the left-hand letters had to be ignored (their
role was to prevent simple chunking of the right-hand letters). In all the
pairs of each row and each column of the array, at least two right-hand
letters were the same—except for either one row or one column (in
which all the n right-hand letters were different). The goal was to find
this unique row/column and mark it by clicking at any two of its pairs.
The size of an array (n) increased from three up to six. The time limit for
each of 50 trials was 7.0+2.5n s (i.e., 14.5–22.0 s), which suggested a
time reserve left when compared to the mean RT of 6.29 s (SD=2.76)
for the easiest items, of 15.4 s (SD=5.61) for the most difficult items,
and the total mean RT of 8.87 s (SD=4.69).
Each trial of Comparing consisted of n vertically-arranged pairs of
simple geometric shapes bound by either the “> ” or “< ” sign (in-
dicating either the “larger than” or “smaller than” relation between the
two shapes, respectively). The number of types of shapes that appeared
in each trial was n+2. Thus, as the overall number of stimuli in the
trial was 2n, some figures belonged to more than one pair. The shapes
were drawn from the pool of seven distinctive shapes. Below the ver-
tical pairs, another four horizontally-arranged pairs were presented,
which comprised the response bank. The goal was to select the two
correct response options that expressed the same relation, as did some
of the target pairs. Crucially, the order of shapes in each correct option
was reversed relative to the respective target pair, for example, ○ > □
changed to □ < ○. Thus, the participant had to compare the meaning
of each relation. In the incorrect options, the order of shapes was re-
versed relative to the corresponding pair while the sign did not change,
or vice versa (i.e., the relation was opposite to the target relation). Only
selecting the two correct options counted as the correct answer. The
difficulty level (n) increased from two to five pairs throughout the task
sequence. The time limit for each of 50 trials was 11.0+ 1.5n s (i.e.,
14.0–18.5 s), while the mean RT equaled 7.21 s (SD=2.13) for the
easiest trials, 12.19 s (SD=3.53) for the most difficult trials, and
10.60 s (SD=3.46) in total.
In each trial of Matching, two directed graphs constructed out of
circles (vertices) and arrows (edges) were presented adjacent to each
other. The two graphs had the same structure of vertices and edges, but
the location of the circles in the right-hand graph was transformed with
respect to the left-hand graph. Always, two circles in the left-hand
graph were highlighted, one in blue and one in yellow. The task was to
find and mark these two circles in the right-hand graph by clicking on
the corresponding circles with the left and the right mouse button for
each color circle, respectively. A small mouse icon with the left and
right button marked in the respective colors was always shown as a
reminder. The blue and the yellow circle had always its exact coun-
terpart in the right-hand graph that remained in the identical relation
with all vertices and edges as was the case for the target circle.
Matching correctly the two target circles across the graphs counted as
the correct response. In most trials, each circle could be identified di-
rectly by its number of incoming and outgoing arrows (degree). In some
potentially more difficult trials, the two targets had the same degree
and therefore could only be discriminated indirectly, on the basis of the
unique relation of the target with another circle. The number of circles
in each graph increased from three in the easiest trials up to six in the
most difficult trials. The number of edges varied between three and six.
The time limit for each of 44 unique trials was 22 s. The mean RT
equaled 10.54 s. (SD=3.85) for the 10 easiest trials, 15.88 s.
(SD=4.26) for the 10 most difficult items, and 13.12 s. (SD=4.52) in
total.
Each task was preceded by directions that included two examples
(with correct responses explained) and a practice session with several
trials with feedback. Participants were advised that only accuracy on
the tasks counted, not speed. To ensure that participants properly un-
derstood each task, the experimental trials started only if the accuracy
on the practice trials reached the pre-specified satisfactory level.
Participants had a maximum of five practice attempts to learn a task,
but most of the participants needed just one attempt. In each task, a
small clock icon was shown 5 s before the trial time limit, to advise the
participant about the brief time remaining. The score on each task was
the mean accuracy across all its trials.
2.3. Reasoning tests
The RAPM test (Raven et al., 1998) consists of 36 problems that
include a 3× 3 matrix of figural patterns, which is missing the bottom-
right pattern, and eight response options comprising the patterns that
could potentially match the missing one. The goal is to discover the
rules that govern the distribution of patterns and apply them to the
response options in order to choose the single correct pattern.
Three subtests (36 items in total) of CFT-3 (Cattell, 1961) were se-
lected: Topology (all 10 items); Series (12 items; one problem was
Fig. 1. Examples of trials from the three relation processing tasks applied in the
study. The frames indicate the correct responses (not shown to participants).
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removed to match the desired number of problems: 36) and Classifi-
cations (14 items; the most difficult and virtually unsolvable problem
was replaced with a newly-designed, easier one). Topology problems
require choosing one option out of five, in which a dot matches all the
topological relations to surrounding geometric elements as in the dis-
played example. The goal in Series problems is to find rules that govern
the sequence of figures and to choose one out of six options that com-
pletes the sequence. Classification problems require choosing two fig-
ures out of five, that, according to some hidden rules, belong to the
same artificial category, while the three remaining figures correspond
to a different category. Each subtest had its separate instruction and
time limit. The Matrices subtest was excluded from CFT-3, because it
overlapped conceptually with RAPM.
The Figural Analogies Test (Analogies; Chuderski & Necka, 2012)
consists of 36 analogies in the form of “A is to B as C is to X,” where A,
B, and C are relatively simple patterns of shapes. A is related to B ac-
cording to two, three, four, or five rules (e.g., symmetry, rotation,
change in size, color, thickness, number of objects), and X is an empty
space. The task is to choose one pattern from an array of four which
relates to C in a manner analogous to B to A.
Based on our previous data, each test and subtest was divided into
two equipotent sets of items, both presenting a comparable average
difficulty (i.e., mean accuracy). Such a division aimed at comparing the
results between the typical paper-and-pencil administration of tests
with their computerized administration, that is, we expected that cor-
relations with the relation processing tasks would be the same regard-
less of the administration. The time limit for each set of RAPM,
Analogies, Topology, Series, and Categories was 20, 15, 5, 6, and 7min,
respectively (these were standard administration times). Each set was
preceded by instructions and two simple examples (including an ex-
planation of the correct responses). The final score on each of the three
tests was the average of correct responses in both sets (the scores on the
three CFT-3 subtests were summed).
2.4. Working memory tasks
The spatial simple span task was modeled after a respective complex
span task (Conway et al., 2005), but did not include the concurrent
task. The task presented three, four, five, or six stimuli (set size) se-
quentially for 1.2 s each. Each stimulus was a 3×3 grid with one
random cell filled red. After the grids presentation, participants had to
recall the red filling locations in the proper order by pointing out with
the mouse the respective cells on empty grids. The figural complex span
task (also modeled after Conway et al., 2005) involved the same pro-
cedure, but the stimuli were shapes (e.g. squares, triangles) and, to
prevent their chunking, each grid was followed by a concurrent task to
decide whether a presented color is light or dark. Four and five trials
per set size were applied in each task, respectively. A variant of mental
counters task (Larson, Merritt, & Williams, 1988) presented a 120-item
sequence of the A, B, and C letters in random order (with each letter
displayed for 2.5 s.). The goal was to count how many times each letter
had been presented, up to four times. Participants decided whether they
had seen the letter either for the fourth time (target) or a lesser time
than four (non-target). So, the letter counters had to be updated con-
tinuously. The final score was the hit rate for targets minus the false
alarm rate for non-targets (as suggested by Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988).
2.5. Procedure
The study took place in a psychology laboratory at a central
European university. Participants were tested in groups of two to eight
people. First, two semantic analogy tests, which were part of a separate
research project, were completed by participants; this took about
20min. Next, the reasoning tests and the relation processing tasks were
administered. Each participant completed two sets of RAPM, Analogies,
and each of the CFT-3 subtests. Each set could be administered in either
the paper-and-pencil format or on the computer. First, half the parti-
cipants, randomly selected, completed the paper-and-pencil variants of
the reasoning tests, whereas the other half completed their computer-
ized variants. Next, the relation processing tasks was completed by all
the participants. Then, the participants who had completed the paper-
and-pencil variants of the reasoning tests attempted their computerized
variants, whereas those who had completed the computerized variants
attempted the paper-and-pencil variants. Finally, the three WM tasks
were administered. The entire procedure took about 3.5 h and included
a 10-min break. Snacks and drinks were provided to participants during
the break.
2.6. Missing data and data preparation
Sixteen participants (6.5%) were excluded from all the following
analyses because of lack of proper engagement, as indicated by very
low scores and very short response times in at least one reasoning test
or relation processing task, and/or because of missing multiple mea-
sures. Thus, the final dataset consisted of 229 participants. Three par-
ticipants scored close to the guessing rate (< 0.20) on a single relation
processing task but scored normally on all the remaining measures, so
these single scores were removed, but the participants were not ex-
cluded. Two participants missed one set of a single reasoning test and
seven participants missed one WM task. Due to a technical error, scores
of as many as 35 participants on Monitoring were not saved. Also, two
multivariate outliers were identified using Mahalanobis distance – the
two outlying scores were removed but the participants were included.
All the above missing values (2.2% of the dataset) were imputed by the
expectation-maximization algorithm implemented in SPSS (IBM Corp,
2017).
3. Results
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for all nine measures. The re-
liability of Monitoring, Comparing, and Matching was very good
(McDonald's ωs around 90). All the measures approximated closely the
normal distribution (skew<2.0, kurtosis< 4.0). Table 2 shows the
respective correlation matrix. The correlations of Comparing and
Matching with reasoning tests were strong (from r=0.52 to 0.61),
while the correlations of Monitoring were slightly weaker
(r=0.44–0.55).
The key analysis consisted of the test of CFA Model 1a (Fig. 2) that
included three factors: the latent variables of Relation Processing, Fluid
Reasoning, and WMC. The fit of the model was good, χ2(24)= 44.13,
Bentler's confirmatory fit index (CFI)= 0.977 (criterion value>0.950;
see Hu & Bentler, 1999), the root mean square error of approximation
Table 1
Descriptive statistics for the measures used in the study. N=229.
Measure Mean SD Min Max Skew Kurtosis ω
Monitoring 0.80 0.14 0.22 1.00 −1.6 3.58 0.90
Comparing 0.75 0.17 0.28 0.98 −0.9 −0.05 0.89
Matching 0.65 0.16 0.23 0.98 −0.3 −0.34 0.95
RAPM (total score) 0.65 0.15 0.25 0.97 −0.2 −0.36 0.83
Analogies (total score) 0.71 0.14 0.31 1.00 −0.5 −0.13 0.77
CFT-3 (total score) 0.64 0.13 0.28 0.94 −0.4 −0.17 0.73
RAPM – paper 0.66 0.17 0.22 0.94 −0.4 −0.33 –
Analogies – paper 0.73 0.16 0.22 1.00 −0.7 0.23 –
CFT-3 – paper 0.67 0.15 0.17 0.94 −0.5 0.01 –
RAPM – computer 0.63 0.17 0.11 1.00 −0.2 −0.24 –
Analogies – computer 0.69 0.16 0.22 1.00 −0.5 0.37 –
CFT-3 – computer 0.62 0.14 0.17 1.00 −0.4 0.17 –
Simple span 0.80 0.11 0.37 1.00 −0.4 0.19 0.80
Complex span 0.58 0.17 0.17 0.97 −0.2 −0.40 0.86
Mental counters 0.51 0.16 0.00 0.96 0.0 0.33 0.93
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(RMSEA)= 0.056 [0.024, 0.084] (criterion value< 0.060). The factor
loadings for Comparing and Matching were high (0.72 and 0.76), with a
slightly lower but still satisfactory loading for Monitoring (0.64; cri-
terion value>0.40; Stevens, 1992). The crucial correlation between
Fluid Reasoning and Relation Processing was very strong (r=0.950), as
well, a test of the difference between two dependent correlations (Lee &
Preacher, 2013) showed that this correlation was significantly stronger
than the WMC-Fluid reasoning link (r=0.857), z= 8.06, p < .001.
Next, in Model 1b, the Relation Processing-Fluid Reasoning link was
constrained to unity. The change in fit was nonsignificant,
∆χ2(2)= 3.38, p= .185, indicating that Relation Processing may be
considered statistically equivalent to Fluid Reasoning. At the same time,
constraining the Fluid Reasoning-WMC link to unity in Model 1c led to a
significant change in fit, ∆χ2(2)= 7.52, p= .023, so WMC was statis-
tically distinct from Fluid Reasoning.
Finally, Model 1a was compared to the two-factor Model 2 in which
Fluid Reasoning loaded both the three reasoning tests and the three re-
lation processing tasks; the second factor was WMC. The difference in
fit between the models was negligible, as indicated by Akaike's in-
formation criterion (AIC; with lower value indicating better fit),
AICModel1a= 86.13, AICModel2= 85.51, ∆AIC=0.62. The fit of a model
in which all the nine measures loaded a single factor was worse,
AIC= 90.62, ∆AIC=4.49, again supporting a relative statistical dis-
tinctness of WMC.
To control for the potential influence of the reasoning test format on
the correlation with relation processing tasks (which were all ad-
ministered on computer), we tested CFA Model 3, which included se-
parate factors for each reasoning test format (paper vs. computer), as
well as Relation Processing and WMC. The model fitted well,
χ2(48)= 83.93, CFI= 0.968, RMSEA=0.053 [0.031, 0.074]. As ex-
pected, the format did not affect validity of the reasoning tests: the two
alternative factors of Fluid Reasoning were identical (r=1.0). Also, the
strength of correlation with Relation Processing (r=0.955 and
r=0.921) andWMC (r=0.837 and r=0.857) was very similar for the
paper and computer formats, respectively, and was close to these two
factors' correlations with the full Fluid Reasoning factor in Model 1.
Finally, SEM Model 4a (Fig. 3a) tested whether Relation Processing
could explain Fluid Reasoning beyond the variance explained by WMC
(the fit of the model was identical to that of Model 1a). In this model,
WMC predicted Fluid Reasoning and Relation Processing; the disturbance
terms of these two variables, representing variance not explained by the
predictor, were correlated. Their correlation (r=0.81) was substantial,
demonstrating that most of the variance in relation processing tasks and
reasoning tests that could not be explained by WMC was shared be-
tween these two variables. In line with this result, the SEM Model 3b
(Fig. 4b) showed that Relation Processing fully mediated the WMC-Fluid
Reasoning link, as the latter path became nonsignificant in this model
when Relation Processing predicted Fluid Reasoning. This result suggested
that the specific WMC variance, not shared with Relation Processing,
failed to predict Fluid Reasoning. At the same,WMC did not mediate the
Relation Processing-Fluid Reasoning link.
One limitation of the above results is that the three relation pro-
cessing tasks did not contribute equally to the actually perfect corre-
lation between the Fluid Reasoning and Relation Processing latent vari-
ables. Fig. 4 shows the relationship of each task score with the Fluid
Reasoning factor z-score (Gf), as well as each task's score distribution.
The lower factor loadings and correlation coefficients observed for
Comparing, and especiallyMonitoring, as compared toMatching, could to
some extent result from the imperfect distributions and slightly limited
ranges due to the certain ceiling effect. Still, the strength of the Gf-
Monitoring and Gf-Comparing correlations was similar to the ones pre-
viously reported in the literature for the similar variants of these tasks
(r≈ 0.5–0.6; Bateman et al., 2019; Chuderski, 2019; Oberauer et al.,
2008). All these zero-order correlations were also stronger than that
usually observed for single measures of WMC (r≈ 0.3–0.5; e.g.,
Shipstead, Lindsey, Marshall, & Engle, 2014; Unsworth et al., 2014). In
line with this, the correlations of the simple span, complex span, and
mental counters tasks with Gf amounted to r=0.52, 0.42, and 0.42,
respectively, suggesting an inferior predicting power of WMC—even at
the level of single tasks.
4. Discussion
Three tasks that required validating a simple relation—that several
symbols were mutually distinct, that one element was superior over the
other (irrespective of their spatial order) and, finally, that pairs of nodes
were interconnected in two graphs in a corresponding way—appeared
to require virtually the same ability tapped by the much more complex
fluid reasoning tests. The latent variable composed of three relation
processing tasks and the latent variable reflecting Gf were statistically
equivalent regardless of whether the latter was measured on the com-
puter or using paper and pencil. The relation processing factor shared
with Gf as much as 90% of the variance, above and beyond the ex-
planatory power of WMC (73%). The latter variable could be clearly
distinguished from Gf. Finally, the relation processing tasks mediated
Table 2
The correlation matrix. All ps < 0.005. N=229.
Measure 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
1. Monitoring –
2. Comparing 0.59 –
3. Matching 0.44 0.57 –
4. RAPM 0.55 0.56 0.60 –
5. Analogies 0.50 0.60 0.61 0.68 –
6. CFT-3 0.44 0.52 0.61 0.66 0.58 –
7. Simple span 0.35 0.42 0.51 0.53 0.41 0.43 –
8. Complex span 0.28 0.25 0.33 0.38 0.37 0.34 0.36 –
9. Mental counters 0.29 0.36 0.39 0.41 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.29
Fig. 2. CFA Model 1a showing an almost perfect correlation between Relation Processing and Fluid Reasoning. The ovals represent factors and the rectangles
represent manifest variables. The values on the arrows are standardized factor loadings and the values between the ovals are correlation coefficients with 95%
confidence intervals.
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the relationship between WMC and Gf, sharing with Gf as much as 66%
of the residual variance left unexplained by WMC. These results are
consistent with previous work that has reported strong correlations
between Gf and various relational processing tasks (e.g., Bateman et al.,
2019; Birney & Bowman, 2009; Buehner, Krumm, & Pick, 2005;
Chuderski, 2014, 2019; Krumm et al., 2009; Oberauer et al., 2008;
Wilhelm et al., 2013).
Therefore, these results allow for purifying the Gf construct, by
showing that some complex cognitive operations, typically evoked in
definitions of Gf (see McGrew, 2009), are in fact dispensable in mea-
suring fluid reasoning. First, in the relation processing tasks, the type of
relation was defined a priori and the relation was provided explicitly
(the participants were even pre-trained on using the relation). Thus, the
processes of discovering the relation and learning do not seem crucial
for Gf. Second, as each relation processing task involved a simple single
relation, Gf is not about the complex integration of multiple relations.
Finally, as the straightforward instructions for these tasks left little
room for factors other than encoding stimuli, constructing bindings,
and/or representing and applying relations, differences in such factors
were unlikely to substantially impact the scores.
These results should not be interpreted as suggesting solely that the
relation processing tasks provide a more parsimonious alternative to
the existing fluid reasoning tests. Rather, these results have crucial
theoretical ramifications. The fact that the relatively simple and uni-
vocal tasks explained almost entire variance in fluid reasoning indicates
that the latter ability (to date not defined sufficiently explicitly) is ac-
tually equivalent to the effectiveness in constructing and maintaining a
single relational representation in the mind (e.g., “Ψ≠Φ & Φ≠Ω &
Ψ≠Ω” in Monitoring or “◊ < ∆” in Comparing) which serves to de-
termine if a given option satisfies the relation represented (i.e., “all the
three symbols differ,” or “∆ > ◊”), or not.
In a way, the present results invoke Spearman's (1927) claims that
the mental ease of dealing with relations is fundamental to fluid in-
telligence (we note that Spearman actually wrote about the g factor but,
in fact, his conceptualization of g makes it quite close to Gf; see
Gustafsson, 1984; McGrew, 2009). However, our results do not simply
confirm Spearman's (1927) (kind of vague) hypothesis but they rather
suggest which aspects of relation processing matter for Gf. The role of
educing relations, i.e., “[the] power to bring to mind any relations that
essentially hold between two or more ideas” (p. 165), as noted above,
does not seem necessary, as relation processing is practically equivalent
to Gf—even if the relation in question is revealed to the participants (it
need not “be brought to mind” per se). The role of educing correlates,
i.e., “[having] in mind any idea together with a relation, . . . power to
bring up to mind the correlative idea” (p. 166), does not seem necessary
either. Perhaps only in the Matching task, projecting the structure of the
left-hand graph onto the right-hand graph—“making the mapping” in
modern terminology—can be interpreted as Spearman's “bringing the
correlative idea,” given that their correlation stems from a shared re-
lational structure. However, the two other relation processing tasks
barely involve processes that could be interpreted as educing correlates
(see Section 1.1). Crucially, the present results suggest that individual
differences in cognitive ability may be driven primarily by “validation
of correlates”: checking whether the current assignment of values to the
consecutive arguments does, or does not, satisfy the target relation. In
consequence, Spearman was right that Gf primarily reflects the ability
to deal with relations; however, the crux of defining Gf in terms of
relations seems to be simpler than Spearman had envisioned.
Furthermore, although this study cannot shed light on the precise
cognitive mechanisms underlying relation processing and Gf, our
second research question referred to WMC as the key factor likely
driving the shared variance among WM tasks, relation processing tasks,
Fig. 3. (a) SEM Model 4a, in which WMC predicts Fluid Reasoning and Relation Processing factors. The numbers inside the small ovals are disturbance terms
reflecting the amount of variance not explained by the predictor. The value between the small ovals is the correlation between the disturbance terms. (b) SEM Model
4b in which Relation Processing fully mediates the WMC-Fluid Reasoning link. The dotted line indicates a nonsignificant path.
Fig. 4. Scatterplots showing the relationship between accuracy on each of three relation processing tasks and the z-score on Fluid Reasoning factor (Gf) calculated
from three reasoning tests. The histograms above the scatterplots show the distribution of each task. N= 229.
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and reasoning tests. WMC provides the necessary resources to perform
each of the three categories of tasks, as all of them rely on upholding
items and constructing and maintaining bindings in WM. Consequently,
as expected, WMC explained most of the variance in relation processing
tasks and reasoning tests. However, while WM tasks may require
maintaining separate bindings (for example between items and their
temporal or spatial order), they do not involve processing explicit re-
lations. Therefore, we think that the shared higher-level requirement of
relation processing tasks and reasoning tests that cannot be accounted
for by WMC is the need to properly integrate the bindings in order to
process a complete relation. Even if all the component information is
properly represented in WM, the invalid assignment of items to the
arguments of a given relation will result in a relational error. Thus, we
think that the ability which allows to effectively validate relations in
the relation processing tasks as well as enables processing more com-
plex structural representations in the reasoning tests is critical for Gf,
while it cannot be simply reduced to WMC.
Although the present study did not measure other elementary cog-
nitive processes besides WMC, such as vigilance, attention control,
short-term storage, long-term memory, processing speed etc., so their
contributions to Gf could not be compared directly with the contribu-
tion of relational processing, to date WMC has been the strongest pre-
dictor of Gf (with correlations ranging 0.60–0.80), while the former
contributions typically fell far below r=0.60 (e.g., Chuderski et al.,
2012; Conway, Cowan, Bunting, Therriault, & Minkoff, 2002; Kane
et al., 2004; Unsworth & Spillers, 2010). Therefore, as in the present
study, WMC contributed to Gf less strongly than did relation processing,
it is unlikely that the latter – virtually full – contribution could be
surpassed by any other elementary process.
The present correlational study contributes to intelligence research
by improving and clarifying the understanding of the Gf construct and
by indicating a new manner of operationalization. This may in turn help
to inspire future correlational as well as experimental studies that could
analyze in greater depth, the relation-processing operations underlying
Gf. In future studies, the more precise experimental control over task
demands is needed to better isolate and possibly disentangle such ab-
stract operations as relation validation and other components of rela-
tional reasoning (for such a recent attempt, see Shokri-Kojori &
Krawczyk, 2018). The relative simplicity of the relation processing tasks
makes them suitable for this purpose. Moreover, future studies might
combine the relation processing tasks with both cognitive experi-
mentation and brain imaging, to shed light on the precise neurocog-
nitive mechanisms underlying relation processing. Finally, representing
and applying relations in the mind/brain should be formalized in
models that would explain these operations in terms of the underlying
mechanisms and elaborate the source of constraints and errors in
human relation processing (for examples of such attempts, see
Chuderski & Andrelczyk, 2015; Doumas, Hummel, & Sandhofer, 2008;
Rasmussen & Eliasmith, 2014; Wilson, Halford, Gray, & Phillips, 2001).
Apart from its theoretical contribution, the present study also yields
practical implications for intelligence research in that it validates re-
lation processing tasks as useful Gf tests. These tasks may overcome
some of the disadvantages of the traditional reasoning tests. Firstly,
reasoning takes time: a typical reasoning test, on average, requires
approximately 1min for an item to be solved (40min is recommended
for the 36 RAPM items). Administration of three different reasoning
tests, necessary to compute the latent Gf variable, may last up to one
hour, even in the case of abbreviated test variants (note that decreasing
the allotted time may produce unwanted effects of time pressure; see
Chuderski et al., 2013; Estrada, Román, Abad, & Colom, 2017; Ren,
Wang, Sun, Deng, & Schweizer, 2018). The relation processing tasks
have significantly shorter completion times—although each task had a
comparable number of items as a full reasoning test, each task could be
completed in 10min on average. Another improvement present in the
relation processing tasks is a decreased guessing probability, resulting
from the requirement to double select the items that make the correct
response. Together with ensuring (via the training session) the proper
understanding of instructions for the tasks, this might have resulted in
the tasks' high reliability (≈ 0.90). Finally, as people become increas-
ingly familiar with typical Gf tests, such as matrix or series completion,
the cultural fairness of these tests and their validity may be corrupted
(and, with that, the very idea of Gf as dealing with novel, knowledge-
lean problems could be threatened). Instead, the relation processing
tasks are highly unfamiliar for each solver. Also, as the tasks do not
resemble typical reasoning tests, the solvers may be oblivious to their
real purpose (i.e., testing individual differences in reasoning ability).
Thus, the relation processing tasks proposed in this investigation can be
an effective psychological tool in basic research and in many applica-
tions.
In conclusion, in the current study, two existing relation processing
tasks were adopted and one new task was developed, to measure the
effectiveness of validation of a simple single relation at the factor level.
The latent variable loading of the three relation processing tasks ex-
plained almost the entire variance in Gf, as measured with typical
reasoning tests. It also outperformed WMC in predicting Gf, sharing
with Gf most of the residual variance left unexplained by WMC. These
results enable greater clarification and better understanding of the Gf
construct, showing what is crucial to its comprehension. The results
indicate that many complex requirements (including rule discovery and
integrations) are not necessary to capture the full variance in Gf.
Instead, the ability to reason in novel abstract problems may be
equivalent to something much simpler: the ability to effectively validate
a single predefined relation.
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